[London] Dienstag [25. März 1856]
Lieber Engels,
In einem nächsten Brief Antwort auf Dein letztes Schreiben. Heute nur eine Anfrage, von der ich wünsche, daß Du sie womöglich umgehend beantwortest. Ich habe heute keinen Artikel an die „Tribune" geschickt, weil ich mit dem Durchlesen des Blue Book über Kars nicht fertig wurde – es geriet mir erst spät gestern abend in die Hand. Ich habe meinen Artikel Freitag abzusenden, gleichzeitig mit dem, den ich von Dir erwarte. Nun ad rem:
Ein großer Teil des Blue Book ist rein militärischer Natur; Du kannst später sehn, ob was damit zu machen ist. Aber über einen Punkt wünsche ich Deine kritische opinion1, da er wesentlich auch für die politisch diplomatische Seite der Sache, und ich darüber schon in dem Freitagartikel sprechen muß. Die Türken schlugen Ende Juni vor, eine Hilfsarmee nach Redut Kale zu schicken, um von da auf Kutais etc. zu operieren. Die englische Regierung ihrerseits wollte Entsatztruppen über Trapezunt nach Erzerum schicken, wie es scheint, Kars als unwesentlichen Punkt aufgebend und Erzerum als Zentrum des Widerstands betrachtend. Jedenfalls wurde mit dieser Streitfrage die zum Handeln günstige Zeit unwiderruflich gekillt. Damit Du fully2 über die question3 informiert bist, füge ich hier die entscheidenden Extracts4 zu.
Stratford de Redcliffe to Clarendon. 28. June, 1855.
„The Turkish ministers, who had talked of sending 10 000 men from Batoum to Erzeroum, now, in their embarrassment, incline to another plan. They propose to form an entrenched camp at Redoute-Kaleh, and to concentrate there the corps of General Vivian – completed by a draft of 10 000 men from the Bulgarian army – that of General Beatson, and the detachment from Batoum, reduced to 7000 men. The total of these combined forces would be about 30 000 of all arms. Stationary they might operate as a diversion in favour of the army at Kars or Erzeroum; advancing by Kutais or Georgia they might either attack the Russians in the rear or force them to retreat."5
Id. to id., 30. June, 1855.
„The meeting which I had previously announced, took place this morning at the Grand Vizier's house on the Bosphorus. In addition to his Highness, the Seraskier and Fuad Effendi were present. I was accompanied by Brigadier-General Mansfield… It appears, that the Russians advancing from Gumri with an amount of force varying from 20–30 000, had presented themselves before Kars; that a partial engagement of Cavalry had taken place, followed two days later by an attack, which had been repulsed, on the part of the enemy, and that the town was threatened with a siege… It was clear, to all present, that whether the Russians besieged or turned Kars, the Turkish army required an effort to be made for its relief with all practicable dispatch, and that of 3 possible modes of acting for that purpose, the only one likely to prove effective was an expedition by Kutais into Georgia. To send reinforcements by Trebizond would be at best a palliative. To establish an entrenched camp at Redoute-Kaleh, would, at this unhealthy season, be equivalent to consigning the troops to destruction. The real question was, whether a force numerically sufficient, and in all respects effective, could be collected in time at Kutais to make an excursion into Georgia and threaten the communications of the Russian army… The Turkish ministers proposed that the expeditionary force should be composed of 12 000 men from Batoum and the neighbouring stations; of the troops made over to General Vivian, and estimated at 10 000 of all arms; of General Beatson's Irregular Cavalry, of 10 000 men to be detracted from the army in Bulgaria as the complement of the Turkish contingent; of 5000 more derived from the same source; of an Egyptian regiment of horse now here, and of another regiment expected from Tunis. To these the Seraskier proposed to add 2000 Albanians by way of riflemen. These several forces… would present a total of 44 000 men, not perhaps to be reckoned with prudence at more than 36 000 effectives."6
Id. to id., 1. July, 1855.
„… the proposed diversion at Redoute-Kaleh originated with the Porte."7
Clarendon to Stratford de Redcliffe. July 13. 1855.
„… Her Majesty's government are of opinion, that the wiser course would be to send reinforcements to the rear of the Turkish army, instead of sending an expedition to the rear of the Russian army. The reinforcements might go to Trebizond, and be directed from thence upon Erzeroum. The distance from Trebizond to Erzeroum is less than that from Redoute-Kaleh to Tiflis, and the march is through a friendly instead of through a hostile country; and at Erzeroum the army would meet supporting friends instead of opposing enemies, and supplies instead of famine. If the army at Kars cannot maintain that position against the Russians, it will be easier to defeat them by the whole force collected, than by divided portions of that force; and a defeat would be the more decisive, the further it took place within the Turkish frontier. Trebizond is a place where supplies of all kinds might be landed etc."8
Id. to id., 14. July, 1855 (Telegraphic).
„The plan for reinforcing the army at Kars contained in your despatch of the 30th June and 1st inst., is disapproved. Trebizond ought to be the base of operations, and if the Turkish army of Kars and Erzeroum cannot hold out at the latter place against the Russians, it might fall back on Trebizond, where it would easily be reinforced."9
Id. to id., 16. July, 1855.
„If, indeed, Omer Pasha… should determine to take any part of his own army, with Tunisians and Albanians to Redoute-Kaleh, Her Majesty's government would have nothing to say to that proceeding, but as regards the contingent under General Vivian and General Beatson's Horse, Her Majesty's government abide by their opinion that they should be directed through Trebizond or Erzeroum."10
Lord Panmure to General Vivian, 14. July, 1855.
„… I place such full reliance on your professional ability, that I feel no anxiety lest you should undertake any expedition of a nature so wild and ill-digested as that contemplated by the Porte… A coup de main by means of suddenly throwing an army on the coast to threaten, or even to attack an enemy's stronghold, is one thing, but a deliberate expedition to invade an enemy's country, and on his own territory to make war upon him, is quite another."11
Ich gestehe, daß Clarendons Strategie und der feine Unterschied, den Lord Panmure Carnot zugunsten des Sewastopol „coup de main" gegen den türkischen Plan einer strategischen Bewegung in Georgien macht, mir höchst kurios vorkommen.
Also, womöglich, antworte über diese Punkte umgehend.
Salut.
Dein
K.M.